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MCCULLOCH’S “PERPETUALLY ARISING”
QUESTIONS
David S. Schwartz*
I’m truly honored to have my book be the subject of a symposium on Balkinization, and I’m deeply grateful to Jack Balkin
and John Mikhail for organizing and hosting it. Among its many
gratifications for me personally, the symposium guaranteed that
at least eight people would read the book. That these readers have
engaged with it so closely and insightfully is icing on the cake.
My first article on McCulloch four years ago, which became
the basis for a couple of the early chapters in the book, insisted
that McCulloch was properly interpreted as far less nationalistic
than we were taught to think.1 But Sandy Levinson persuaded me
that I was mistaken in asserting that there was one true interpretation of the case. The more I thought about it, the more my interpretation of McCulloch, like the arc of federalism history,
would bend toward nationalism. The case is highly—probably
studiedly—ambiguous, and the logic of its theory of implied powers is so decidedly nationalistic that the “aggressive nationalism”
interpretation I take issue with is not exactly wrong. By the time
I completed the book, I had come around to the view that Marshall
tried to mask, and later actually retreated from, the nationalistic
logic of his own McCulloch opinion, and that the Supreme Court
has never consistently embraced that logic.
But if a book winds up as a mental map of the author’s evolving thinking, it will be confusing and will invite conflicting interpretation. I was therefore delighted that the symposium posts
read the book the way I ultimately hoped it to be understood. The
posts by Richard Primus and Victoria Nourse are the sort of book
reviews an author daydreams about: expressing what I tried to
* Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School.
1. David S. Schwartz, Misreading McCulloch v. Maryland, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1,
23 (2015).
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convey in language better than I was able to write, while extending the book’s implications into ideas of their own. Primus is too
modest to say that he is one of the two leading figures (John Mikhail is the other) in the “new wave of literature arguing for . . .
skepticism toward the orthodox account of Congress as a legislature limited by enumerated powers.”2 If my book contributes to
that literature, then my work here is done. Nourse sees my book
as supporting her view of federalism as “a story of judicial hubris.” As she crisply puts it, “No federalism standard created by
courts can destroy the states.”3 But the Court has frequently assumed otherwise, and it is this view, I argue, that has led it to
ignore McCulloch’s full implications for most of the past 200
years.
Franita Tolson and Mark Graber use my brief treatment of
McCulloch and the Reconstruction Amendments as a springboard
for a stimulating discussion of the enforcement clauses. Graber
argues that the rights/structure distinction in constitutional law
teaching and doctrine denigrates the legislative role in creating
and enforcing rights. That’s an extremely important insight that
delegitimates cases like City of Boerne v. Flores4 and Shelby
County v. Holder,5 as well as the Court’s failure to overrule The
Civil Rights Cases6 when upholding the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
Tolson argues here, as in her excellent scholarship,7 for a broad
construction of Congress’s enforcement powers under these
amendments. According to Tolson, the phrase “appropriate legislation” in the enforcement clauses of all three Reconstruction
Amendments signals a design to read these clauses synergistically
with the other enumerated powers of Congress. I couldn’t agree
more that Congress’s enforcement powers under these

2. Richard Primus, Marshaling McCulloch, BALKINIZATION (Nov. 11, 2019)
[https://perma.cc/PK9R-WBNA]. See, e.g., John Mikhail, The Necessary and Proper
Clauses, 102 GEO. L. J. 1045 (2014); Richard Primus, “The Essential Characteristic”: Enumerated Powers and the Bank of the United States, 117 MICH. L. REV. 415 (2018).
3. Victoria Nourse, McCulloch v. Maryland: Not Only Right, But Inevitable,
BALKINIZATION (Nov. 18, 2019)
4. 521 U.S. 507, 527-29 (1997).
5. 570 U.S. 529, 555 (2013).
6. 109 U.S. 3, 14-15, 25 (1883).
7. See e.g., Franita Tolson, The Constitutional Structure of Voting Rights Enforcement,
89 WASH. L. REV. 379, 384-86 (2014).
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amendments should be read broadly, and Tolson and I undoubtedly agree that the Court undermined the spirit of these power
grants in The Civil Rights Cases and Shelby County.
John Mikhail and Kurt Lash, in very different ways, enrich
our understanding of McCulloch’s context. I will reply to Lash
in a separate post. Mikhail shows that McCulloch, rather than
representing the alpha and omega of congressional powers, is but
a piece in the larger puzzle of the Constitution’s enumeration of
powers. 8 That puzzle is whether the Constitution limited the national government to its enumerated powers. Mikhail, as I noted
above, is the leading figure along with Richard Primus in an
emerging body of scholarship suggesting that the Constitution’s
grant of powers was not so limited. Mikhail’s current post, along
with his recent Balkinization symposium contribution on Jonathan Gienapp’s splendid The Second Creation,9 are essential reading on this vital question. As Mikhail demonstrates, this question
cannot be answered by cherry-picking quotations from The Federalist or the ratification debates, but requires disentangling the
positions taken in the series of debates from the Philadelphia Convention through the First Congress, with careful attention to the
constitutional position of slavery. Mikhail’s dueling “slavery syllogisms,” by which he explains the pro-slavery motivation behind
a limited-enumerated-power interpretation of the Constitution,
are a brilliant addition to scholarship on federal powers.
Anything written about McCulloch since 2006 owes a huge
debt to Mark Killenbeck’s and Sandy Levinson’s scholarship on
the case.10 Along with that of Gerard Magliocca and Jack Balkin,11 their work asks whether we really understand McCulloch as
8. John Mikhail, McCulloch, Slavery, and the Sweeping Clause, BALKINIZATION
(Nov. 25, 2019)
9. John Mikhail, Fixing the Constitution’s Implied Powers, BALKINIZATION (Oct. 25,
2018), [ https://perma.cc/9WS2-FD6V]; JONATHAN GIENAPP, THE SECOND CREATION:
FIXING THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION IN THE FOUNDING ERA 68 (2018).
10. See, e.g., MARK R. KILLENBECK, M’CULLOCH V. MARYLAND: SECURING A NATION
90 (2006); J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 HARV.
L. REV. 963, 1008 (1998); Sanford Levinson, The Confusing Language of McCulloch v.
Maryland: Did Marshall Really Know What He Was Doing (or Meant)?, 72 ARK. L. REV. 7,
9 (2019).
11. Gerard N. Magliocca, A New Approach to Congressional Power: Revisiting the
Legal Tender Cases, 95 GEO. L.J. 119, 125 (2006); Balkin & Levinson, supra note 10; Jack
M. Balkin, The Use That the Future Makes of the Past: John Marshall’s Greatness and Its
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well as we think we do, and why and how it holds a place within
the “canon” of constitutional law. In his post, Killenbeck argues
that McCulloch presents “a far more Marshallian conception of
federal power” than is recognized in revisionist accounts, particularly when we consider Marshall’s felt need to navigate the hostile Jeffersonian-Republican political environment in which he
wrote. I agree with Killenbeck that Marshall obscured McCulloch
in a (perhaps vain) effort to preempt attacks on the Court by strict
constructionists while offering a theory of implied powers that
was indeed “robust.” But Marshall himself backed away from the
robust implications of implied powers almost immediately after
the opinion was issued—starting with his April and June 1819
editorials defending McCulloch12 and more consequentially in
Gibbons v. Ogden (1824).13 Thus, to my mind, Marshall’s failure
to cite McCulloch in later cases, which Killenbeck attributes to
Marshall’s judicial writing style, was more substantive in its implications. For reasons I explain in Chapter 4, Marshall refrained
from applying the broad implied powers concept to the Commerce Clause, where it might have done significant work in advancing nationalist jurisprudence. In part for that reason, and in
contrast to the conventional view, I argue that the appellation “nation builder” applies far more accurately to Marshall’s National
Republican contemporaries Henry Clay and John Quincy Adams
than it does to Marshall. Clay and Adams, unlike Marshall, actually argued that the Constitution blessed the building of national
infrastructure.14
Sandy Levinson has read and parsed the McCulloch opinion
more than anyone: even in conversation, he can quote passages,
chapter and verse, and can cite them by paragraph number. In his
symposium contribution, Levinson continues to raise probing
questions about Marshall’s argumentative technique and conceptual difficulties in McCulloch. For example, what did Marshall

Lessons for Today’s Supreme Court Justices, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1321, 1336-37
(2002).
12. See JOHN MARSHALL’S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 78, 155 (Gerald
Gunther, ed. 1969).
13. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 33 (1824).
14. DAVID S. SCHWARTZ, THE SPIRIT OF THE CONSTITUTION: JOHN MARSHALL AND
THE 200-YEAR ODYSSEY OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 46-47, 59-80 (2019).
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mean when calling Maryland a “sovereign” state in the opinion’s
first line? Levinson also shows us that there is much more to be
learned from the frequently underemphasized second section of
the opinion, dealing with the taxation question, which Levinson
dubs “McCulloch II.” Levinson’s longstanding love affair with
McCulloch was a source of inspiration to my research, but his
post, and more recent writing—including his Salmon P. Chase
Lecture—look like a series of “Dear John [Marshall]” break-up
letters.15 He continues to call Marshall’s opinion the work of “a
rhetorical genius,” but questions the quality of Marshall’s reasoning, particularly on such key concepts as “sovereignty” and the
concurrent power of taxation. Levinson goes so far as to suggest
that Holmes’s “famously snarky address” on John Marshall Day
in 190116 may offer more truth than the conventionally idolatrous
portraits of Marshall.
Levinson’s post demonstrates that McCulloch is a deep, if
not bottomless, well of ambiguity such that new interpretations of
it, to borrow Marshall’s phrase, “will probably continue to arise,
as long as our system shall exist.” Levinson is therefore quite
right that my book cannot be a “definitive” account of McCulloch;
I can only hope that it is a useful contribution to an ongoing dialogue.

15. Levinson, supra note 10, at 28-30; Sanford Levinson, Salmon P. Chase Distinguished Lecture at the Georgetown Center for the Constitution, 2019 Salmon P. Chase Lecture and Colloquium: The 200th Anniversary of McCulloch v. Maryland (Dec. 5, 2019).
16. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, John Marshall, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 266
(1920).

